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1 Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis began in 2007 when the subprime mortgage crisis originated in the US
spread rapidly to most financial markets around the globe. This resulted in global stock markets
experiencing substantial fall in asset prices and entered a period of high volatility. Major banks
and financial institutions also faced serious liquidity problems while governments around the world
attempted to coordinate efforts to provide financial rescue.
The 2007 subprime mortgage crisis eventually lead to a global recession. Mishkin (2011) discusses
both the crisis and global recession. He terms the first phase as "The Subprime Mortgage Crisis"
that began when the French bank BNP Paribas suspended redemption of shares held in some of its
money market funds. He carries on to explain that a boom in the US housing prices, which peaked
at around 2005, started to decline. Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) — in many cases, securities
based on subprime residential mortgages divided into more senior claims that were supposedly
safe and junior claims that were recognized to be risky — began to experience huge losses as a
consequence. What developed in late 2007 and into 2008 was a series of runs on financial institutions
with the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 as one such example.
Mishkin (2011) terms the global recession as the second phase which began with the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. The fourth-largest investment bank by asset size with over $600 billion in assets
and 25,000 employees filed for bankruptcy on 15th September 2008. It is considered to be the largest
bankruptcy filing in US history. Mishkin (2011) argues that although the Lehman bankruptcy led to
a large increase in uncertainty and a wave of distressed selling of securities that caused a collapse
in asset prices and a drying up of liquidity, three major events following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers potentially caused the subprime crisis to spread globally. These events are (i) the collapse
of AIG on 16th September 2008; (ii) the run on the Reserve Primary Fund on the same day; and (iii)
the struggle to get the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) approved by Congress over the following
couple of weeks.
Mishkin (2011) discusses the links between Financial Crisis to recession, providing evidence
showing that GDP growth in the US economy had slowed down in the third quarter of 2008, falling
at −1.3 percent per annum. But it was in the fourth quarter of 2008 that the recession that started
in December 2007 became the worst economic contraction in the United States since World War
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II. Real US GDP contracted sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009,
declining at annual rates of –5.4 and –6.4 percent, respectively. The unemployment rate skyrocketed,
exceeding 10 percent by October 2009. A worldwide recession later ensued, with the world economic
growth rate falling at an annual rate of –6.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 and –7.3 percent
in the first quarter of 2009.
Unlike past crises, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, and the 1999
Brazilian crisis, the global financial crisis of 2008 was originated from the largest and most influential
economy, the US. This crisis seemed to trigger a prolonged worldwide fear of contagion and cause
a fundamental change in the correlations among international markets, including both developed
and emerging markets, which eventually lead to a global recession as research from Cheung et al.
(2010) suggest. In this paper, we aim to study the effects of this crisis by analysing the potential
contagion in the stock markets. Our aim is to investigate whether major news events related to the
crisis, reported during the period, had such an effect. We track the news events, in both the UK and
the US, during the credit crisis using the Global Recession Timeline which covers the main events
taking place in the first and second stages of the credit crisis as discussed in Mishkin (2011). Table 1
lists the major news events covered in the timeline. In addition to the effects of news events, we also
include market sentiments and market volatility in our study. Our model adds two control variables:
(i) VIX which we use as a proxy for market sentiments; and (ii) the conditional volatility, estimated
using a bivariate GARCH technique to capture the spillover effects between markets.
We organise the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature. Section 3 describes the
data used in this study while the statistical methodology is explained in Section 4. We present and
discuss our estimation results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This section reviews the literature and discusses the use of contagion measures in research. We
also discuss the use of correlation and coexceedance in the literature as well as the application of
coexceedance to detect contagion using the quantile regression.
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2.1 Correlations as Contagion Measures
Correlations have long been used as a measure of contagion academic literature. However, there have
also been discussions on the limitation of using correlation for such purpos. Dungey et al. (2005),
for example, provide a review on the use of methodology related to contagion measures, which is
popularised by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Compared to Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Dungey et al.
(2005) discusses the work of Eichengreen et al. (1995), Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Bae et al.
(2003), pointing out that when evaluating extent of contagion, these research papers differ in their
approaches to separate the crisis from the non-crisis periods, which affect the choice of methodology
employed. For Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the determination of the crisis period is a priori. They
test if correlation changes between the crisis and non-crisis periods. Dungey et al. (2005) argue
that if asset returns vary with no change to the fundamental relationship between assets returns
in the two markets — which result in the correlations of returns in crisis period being higher than
that of the non-crisis period — then the approach gives a false appearance of contagion. To adjust
for this bias, Dungey et al. (2005) report that Forbes and Rigobon (2002) modify the asset return
correlations by scaling them with a nonlinear function of the percentage change in volatility in the
asset return of the source country, considering both the crisis and the non-crisis periods. They
provide a prescriptive procedure to correct for the bias in the correlation measure, showing that using
the unmodified correlation measure to quantify contagion or interdepdence may be inappropriate.
2.2 Coexceedance as Contagion Measures
Dungey et al. (2005) also discuss Bae et al. (2003) who define quantile-based threshold to separate
the occurrences of extreme returns from non-extreme returns. In this case, co-exceedances exist
when returns of the underlying assets follow the same pattern as that of the threshold. In Bae et
al. (2003), they first define an extreme return — or an exceedance — as a return that lies below
(above) the 5th (95th) quantile of the marginal return distribution. Building upon the concept of
exceedance, Bae et al. (2003) introduce a measure to assess the joint occurrences of large or small
returns: a coexceedance. They define coexceedances as the joint occurrences of i exceedances of
negative (positive) returns on a particular day — in other words, the number of i units of joint
negative (positive) returns. To determine whether there are more frequent joint occurrences of large
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absolute value returns than expected, Bae et al. (2003) validate the outcomes using Monte Carlo
simulations of the joint returns generating processes of international stock market returns with
different assumptions about their structures. To investigate the extent to which coexceedances can
be used to assess contagions, they develop an econometric model of the joint occurrences of large
absolute value returns using multinomial logistic regression — a methodology frequently used in
epidemiology research on contagious diseases in which answer can be provided on the effect of the
contagion of diseases (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989).
2.2.1 Coexceedance and Asymptotic Dependency Properties of Asset Returns
Apart from Bae et al. (2003) who adopt the coexceedance measure as an alternative to the correlation
measure, existing literature also investigates the asymptotic dependency properties of assets’ returns
and how it contributes to contagion. One such example is Chan-Lau et al. (2004) who assess the
extent of contagion between two underlying markets using patterns and behaviours of coexceedances.
They claim that such an approach is often related to the extreme value theory (EVT) which captures
the belief of most observers in the private sectors and policymakers that large shocks transmit across
financial markets differently from small shocks. They argue that measuring contagion, therefore,
requires a determination of the asymptotic dependence class of the series analysed and propose
the use of an extremal dependence measure, first documented in Poon et al. (2004). Asymptotic
dependence structures can be used to measure different degrees of dependency. Two dependent
structures occur when both underlying time series approach their upper or lower limit. As one
variable tends to the upper (lower) limit, the probability of the other variable approaching its upper
(lower) limit goes to zero for asymptotically independent random variables, but to a nonzero limit
for asymptotically dependent variables. This implies that a joint occurrence of extreme values is
unlikely for asymptotically independent variables.
Chan-Lau et al. (2004) suggest that such a methodological framework of extremal dependence
measures can be measured along two dimensions. The first dimension is linked to changes in the
asymptotic properties of the joint tail distribution of equity returns. Contagion is stronger between
two countries if the return series are asymptotically dependent: realisations of extreme returns in
both countries are likely to occur simultaneously. Therefore, two countries with asymptotically
independent joint tail distribution will experience increasing contagion if the joint tail distribution
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becomes asymptotically dependent. Chan-Lau et al. (2004) also observe that an increase in the
number of country-pair returns exhibiting asymptotically dependence suggests increasing contagion
worldwide as structural changes in the transmission mechanism lead to changes in the asymptotic
properties of the joint tail distribution. The second dimension, as also discussed in Chan-Lau
et al. (2004), is associated with changes in the dependent measure when the type of asymptotic tail
property remains unchanged. In this case, an increase in contagion between two countries is reflected
in an increase in the dependence measure rather than changes in the joint tail distribution pattern.
The original framework of extremal dependence measure in Poon et al. (2004), however, focuses
more on the evaluation of the assumption made about the asymptotic dependence of the two return
distributions while the impact it has on the estimation of portfolio risk is analysed. To do this, a
two-asset portfolio is formed to show the consequence of assuming asymptotic dependence when
asset returns are asymptotically independent. The probability of the largest possible portfolio losses
is evaluated using (i) a Monte Carlo simulation that assumes a distributional pattern following a
dependence structure with a specified marginal distribution based on a Generalised Pareto distribution
(GPD) and (ii) a simulation of the Gaussian dependence structures based on a bivariate extreme
value distribution with logistic dependence structures, which accounts for the asymptotic dependence
or independence of the two variables underlying the portfolio.1 Poon et al. (2004) suggest that
the concept of extremal dependence structure is related to the concept of copula. Their paper
subsequently shows that Gaussian copula corresponds to the case of asymptotic independence while
a logistic copula corresponds to the case of asymptotic dependence.
Based on copula model, Busetti and Harvey (2011) investigate if dependency between assets’
returns change over time. They first denote τ th quantile as ζ(τ). The probability that an observation
is less than ζ(τ) is τ , where 0 < τ < 1. Given a set of T observations, yt, t = 1, . . . T, the sample
quantile, ζ(τ), can be obtained by sorting the observations in ascending order. They recoded the
residuals associated with a quantile as indicators, in which they define as τ -quantile indicator, listed
as follows:
IQ (yt − ζ (τ)) =


τ − 1, if yt < ζ (τ)
τ, if yt > ζ (τ)
, t = 1, . . . , T (1)
1In the Monte Carlo simulation, a Generalised Pareto Distribution (GPD) is assumed when the return is above the
threshold, while an empirical distribution is used when the return is below the threshold.
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Busetti and Harvey (2011) comment that a stationarity test statistic based on the τ -quantile may
be constructed by using the quantics, IQ(yt − Âζ(τ)), t = 1, . . . ,T , in the test statistic of Nyblom and
Mäkeläinen (1983) in place of the residuals from the sample mean. Busetti and Harvey (2011) further
assume that ζ(τ) is the unique population τ -quantile and y has a continuous positive density in the
neighborhood of ζ(τ). They also comment on the work of Busetti and Harvey (2007) which shows
that, under the null hypothesis that the observations are independently and identically distributed
(IID), the asymptotic distribution of the quantic-based stationarity test statistic is the Cramer
von Mises (CvM) distribution as shown below. A joint test to see if a group of N quantiles or
combinations of quantiles show evidence of changing over time can be based on a generalization of
the equation below.
ητ (Q) =
1
T 2τ (1 − τ)
Tÿ
t=1
A
tÿ
i=1
IQ
1
yi − ζ˜ (τ)
2B2
(2)
Busetti and Harvey (2011) suggest that the tests in Busetti and Harvey (2007) are designed
to detect movements in the quantiles of the distributions of a univariate series. If the marginal
distributions of two time series are time invariant, then the following question is naturally whether
their copula is changing over time. As with a univariate series, the tests are based on indicators,
but in this case, combinations of quantiles from the two series would have to be used. To simplify
matters, quantiles are normally assumed to be the same for the two series to be used to evaluate the
probability that both observations lie below their respective τ -quantiles. Stationarity test statistics
can then be formed from these bi-quantics provided in Busetti and Harvey (2011) as follows:
ητ (BQ;BB) =
1
T 2CT (τ, τ) (1 − CT (τ, τ))
Tÿ
t=1
A
tÿ
i=1
BIQi (τ)
B2
(3)
2.2.2 Coexceedances in the Quantile Regression Framework
Baur and Schulze (2005) follow the approaches of Poon et al. (2004), Bae et al. (2003) and Chan-Lau
et al. (2004) when assessing common occurrences of extreme returns. They investigate the extent of
contagion by estimating both the upper and lower tails of the return distributions based on threshold
returns. Bae et al. (2003) investigate the effects of contagion by computing the coexceedances
and apply a multinomial logistic regression framework to identify factors and to what extent they
contribute to contagion. Baur and Schulze (2005), however, investigate the extent of contagion
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by computing and applying the coexceedances in the quantile regression framework. The quantile
processes allow the evolution of coexceedances to be shown over the distribution of coexceedance.
Baur and Schulze (2005) also analyse the extent to which market announcement events and other
market variables contribute to the contagion. Their findings provide different insights into the causes
of contagion in time of market crisis.
Baur and Schulze (2005) redefine coexceedances to reveal information on the degrees of coex-
ceedances of the underlying asset returns. In the bivariate case, the coexceedance of two return pairs
r1 and r2 at time t is defined as follows:
Coext (r1, r2) =


min (r1t, r2t) if r1t > 0, r2t > 0
max (r1t, r2t) if r1t < 0, r2t < 0
0 otherwise
(4)
In this case, the coexceedance measure is interpreted as the value of (extreme) movement that is
shared by both markets. Similar to that in Poon et al. (2004) and Chan-Lau et al. (2004), Baur
and Schulze (2005) focus only on two markets. From (4), it can be seen that, the smaller value is
chosen should two values exhibit positive returns on the same day. On the other hand, a larger
value is picked when two returns exhibit negative returns. This way of defining the ‘shared’ value is
conservative: it tends to bias towards the market that is affected less regardless of the direction of the
markets. Therefore, if the conditional value based on the above model is −2% in the ‘down’ market,
then both returns are at least −2% during the day the observation is made. The conditional value
captures a common movement observed from the magnitude of the returns of the two underlying
assets. Given the observations documented in Le et al. (2012) that market shocks during the credit
crisis period are associated with governmental intervention — both in its initial and in its cleaning-up
afterwards — this paper includes similar news of governmental intervention as well as news of
financial firms’ failures during the periods of credit crisis to assess how their impact on market
contagion. Our approach of evaluating market contagion is also supported by Cheung et al. (2010)
who suggest that shocks originated from the US during the credit crisis of 2008 has a prolonged
worldwide fear and could potentially cause fundamental changes in the correlations among both
developed and emerging markets.
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3 Data
We use weekly continuously compounded index returns on the stock markets of the following countries:
US, UK, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines. For each market, the returns
from the Morgan Stanley Country Index (MSCI) for each respective market are used as proxies
for stock market performance. Our sample starts from 9/3/2005 and ends in 28/12/2011. The
reason for using weekly frequency is that it enables opening and closing trading hours to be properly
synchronised. The timeframe covers the period in which news events related to the credit crisis or
global recession, presented in Table 1, took place. As a proxy for the risk-free rate, we use the yields
on the 3-month T-bills. To evaluate whether contagion is reflected in market sentiments variables,
we use VIX as a proxy for investors’ sentiments.2
We present descriptive statistics of the data in Table 2. All the four European markets have
negative mean returns, while the mean returns for the other markets range from 0.001% (Taiwan) to
0.3366% (Indonesia). Of all the countries in our sample, Brazil has the highest standard deviation
(5.48%). This can be explained by its lowest minimum return of -44.5%, even though it has the
highest median return of 0.96%. All the markets exhibit negative skewness, implying that the return
distributions tend to cluster below the value of mean returns.3
Table 3 shows the unconditional correlation structure between all the stock market returns for
the whole time span. It can be seen that all the values are positive, thereby reflecting regional
and economic relationships. Table 4 divides the correlations into the tranquil and crisis periods4.
These correlations between markets differ before and during the crisis periods. For example, the
correlation measure for Singapore and the US increases from 0.37 before the crisis to 0.68 during the
crisis. However, some of the correlation measures do not change or only change very little before
and during the crisis periods (such as the correlation coefficients for the UK and Korea). Facing
this, Embrechts et al. (2000) offer an alternative explanation: they point out that if the assumption
of bivariate normality underlying the stock returns is violated, then correlations may not capture
2VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. It is based on the volatility implied by options
contracts on the S&P 500 index and is an estimate of future volatility.
3Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for data from 9/3/2005 to 28/12/2011, the entire period for the studies.
These are similar when narrowing the period from the first of the news report till the last, i.e., from 2007 to 2009.
4We use 2005 and 2006 as the tranquil period, while 2007 to 2009 as the crisis period
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the non-linear patterns underlying the data.
Considering Embrechts et al. (2000), we carry out the Mardia’s multivariate normality test,
discussed in Mardia (1970), that accounts for both skewness and kurtosis.5 Our results show that the
null hypotheses of bivariate normality between the US, the UK and their respective 15 stock market
index returns are all rejected, implying that return correlations are nonlinear throughout the period
of study. Table 5 shows that joint negative shocks occur less frequently than joint positive shocks
for both the US and the UK markets. The country pairs with the least and the most numbers of
observations in our datasets are the US and Taiwan with 229 observations and UK and France with
315 observations, respectively. As we can see in Table 6, all of the distributions of coexceedances
are asymmetric and negatively skewed, suggesting that the magnitudes of joint negative shocks are
larger than those of joint positive shocks. When both markets fall, they fall sharply. The results in
both Tables 5 and 6 strongly support the use of quantile regression technique instead of conventional
correlation coefficients to quantify the extent of contagion. We explain our approach in the next
section.
4 Modelling Contagion Effect in a Two-Stage Quantile Regression
We use a two-stage approach to model the contagion effect. The first stage involves estimating the
conditional volatility by fitting the return series — both the UK and the US return series — to the
BEKK-GARCH specification which we explain below.
4.1 The BEKK-GARCH Model
A natural extension of univariate GARCH, multivariate GARCH approaches allow the conditional
variance-covariance matrix to be a function of both lagged values of volatility and covariance, thereby
taking into consideration the ‘spillover’ effect between the crisis-originating stock market (i.e., the
US and the UK) and the world stock market when the conditional volatility is estimated. In this
paper, we adopt the BEKK-GARCH specification. The restrictions imposed on the BEKK-GARCH
is important as they make the model mathematically tractable.
Consider the following system of equations:
5Please refer to Appendix A.I for more details of the test.
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Ht= C
Õ
C+
qÿ
i=1
A
Õ
iεt≠iε
Õ
t≠iAi+
pÿ
j=1
B
Õ
jHt≠jBj . (5)
where rt= εt and εt= H
1/2
t zt. The matrices A, B and C are n × n matrices. We assume that C
Õ
C
is either upper or lower triangular. Note that n is the number of markets to be modelled. In our
paper, where n = 2, the BEKK-GARCH(1,1) can be explicitly written as follows:
S
WU
σ2i,t σim,t
σmi,t σ
2
m,t
T
XV =
S
WU
c11 0
c21 c22
T
XV+
S
WU
a11 a21
a12 a22
T
XV
S
WU
ε2i,t≠1 εi,t≠1εm,t≠1
εm,t≠1εi,t≠1 ε
2
m,t≠1
T
XV
S
WU
a11 a12
a21 a22
T
XV+
S
WU
b11 b21
b12 b22
T
XV
S
WU
σ2i,t≠1 σim,t≠1
σmi,t≠1 σ
2
m,t≠1
T
XV
S
WU
b11 b12
b21 b22
T
XV . (6)
The parameters in (5) can be estimated using maximum likelihood. (Appendix A.II shows the
functional form of the log-likelihood function.) Notice that the BEKK-GARCH model specifies
the conditional variance and covariance of one variable as a function of lagged values of the other
variables. Specifically, the BEKK-GARCH model is simply a restricted version of the VEC-GARCH
model, originally proposed by Bollerslev et al. (1988), but with the conditional variance-covariance
matrix constructed to be positive definite. The restriction guarantees convergence when the model
is estimated using maximum likelihood.
Similar to Baur and Schulze (2005), we use the calculated conditional volatility as a control
variable. This is in response to the argument in Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who state that volatility
underlying the datasets could often bias correlation as an effective measure for contagion.
4.2 Quantile Regression
In the second stage, we use the quantile regression (QR) technique to investigate the relationship
between the coexceedance and the explanatory variables at different points on the distribution of
coexceedance. Because of a number of similarities between QR and the ordinary least square (OLS),
it is useful to compare and contrast both techniques. Using OLS regression, the parameters of
interest βˆ in a simple linear model — yt = x
Õ
tβ + εt — measure the responsiveness of yt to xt when
yt is assumed to take the mean value. In contrast, QR estimates the conditional quantile function of
yt based on xt, thus allowing the responsiveness of yt to xt at different quantiles on the distribution
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of yt to be measured.
In this paper, we fit the following QR model to the US and the UK data:
qτ (Coext | Ωt) = ατ + βτ Dt + γτ V IXt + δτ σˆt (7)
where qτ (•) is the conditional quantile function evaluated at the τ
th quantile; Ωt is the information
set available at time t; ατ , βτ , γτ and δτ are the parameters to be estimated at the τ
th quantile.
The dummy variable Dt takes the value of 1 during the periods corresponding to the news
events related to the credit crisis (specifically, for the US and the UK separately) and 0 otherwise.
The variable V IXt is the measure of investors’ sentiments. And the conditional volatility σˆt is
calculated as the square root of σ2i,t — an element in the matrix Ht — obtained from (5). For each
pair of countries, the coexceedance variable is calculated using the criteria in (4). We discard the
observations where the coexceedance takes the value of 0 because they distort the quantile regression
results.
For a fixed value of τ , the parameters ατ , βτ , γτ and δτ can be estimated by the following linear
minimisation:
min
ατ ,βτ ,γτ ,δτ
Tÿ
t=1
ρτ [Coext − qτ (Coext | Ωt)] (8)
where ρτ (z) is the check function given by ρτ (z) = z
1
τ − 1[z≤0]
2
and where ρτ (z) imposes different
weights on positive and negative residuals.
As pointed out in Kim and Muller (2008), because the conditional volatility is fitted using the
BEKK-GARCH model in the first stage, the intercept term in the two-stage quantile regression is
biased. We therefore do not attempt to interpret the intercept term αˆt in this paper. Moreover, we
bootstrap the standard errors in the second stage using the technique described in Efron (1987) to
obtain correct the standard errors. The number of bootstrap replication for each estimation is 5, 000.
It is worth noting that the parameter βτ reveals information about the behavior of the coex-
ceedance during the crisis period. If, for example, the coefficient βτ is significantly below zero at the
lower quantiles (e.g., the 5th quantile), not only we can argue that the (extreme) negative movement
shared by both of the markets is significantly lower during the turmoil period, but we are also able to
make statements about the severity of the observed contagion. Since the quantile regression model
accounts for different regimes of coexceedances, our approach is more informative than existing
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definitions and measures of contagion.
The simple quantile regression specification accounts for any other covariates that potentially
have an impact on the structure of the coexceedances. An increased volatility during the crisis
period might lead to larger extreme coexceedances, we include a similar parameter in our model.
This parameter accounts for the heteroscedasticity underlying the spillover effects between the UK
or the US market and the world market. We use VIX as a proxy for the investor’s attitude towards
global risk as existing literature on contagion shows that investors’ sentiment plays an increasing
role in the cascading effects of financial crises. Similar application can also be seen in Ismailescu and
Kazemi (2011), McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) and Remolona et al. (2007). In this case, an increase
(decline) in the volatility index (i.e., the VIX index) is assumed to signal a rise in investors’ aversion
towards global risk. We expect a positive relationship between VIX and the negative coexceedances
and a negative relationship with positive coexceedances. Furthermore, we include the estimated
conditional volatility σˆt computed using the BEKK-GARCH model to further assess the spillover
effect between the crisis-originating markets and the global stock market on the coexceedances
during the credit crisis period. We present our results in the next section.
5 Results and Discussions
In this section, we present the quantile regression results of Eq. (7). As explained above, the BEKK-
GARCH model is first fitted to the data on returns for both stock markets; the model specifications
for the US and the UK are BEKK-GARCH(1,1) and BEKK-GARCH(1,2) respectively.6 To ensure
that the models adequately fit the data, we calculate the Ljung-Box statistics (Ljung and Box,
1978) for both the standardised and the squared standardised residuals for up to 12 lags. The test
statistics for the US are 13.64 and 9.08; while the statistics for the UK are 13.95 and 11.71. Under
the null hypotheses, the statistics for the US and the UK have chi-square distributions with 10 and
9 degrees of freedom respectively. The results for both the US and the UK suggest that the null
hypotheses of the overall insignificance of residual autocorrelations cannot be rejected, implying that
the BEKK-GARCH models chosen can adequately explain the data.
Tables 7, 8 and 9 show the quantile regression results for (7) for each of the explanatory variables:
6We use the Akaike information criteria to select the best-fitting models.
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the crisis dummy, market sentiment index (VIX) and the conditional volatility respectively. These
three variables are all included in the two stage quantile regression analyses, but findings are
separately presented in these three tables to show how they evolve over different quantiles of the
distributions.
5.1 The Effects of the Credit Crisis on the Coexceedances
Table 7 presents the findings about the effects of the crisis dummy on the coexceedances during
the credit crisis periods. The table presents findings of the contagion effect originating from the
UK and the US7. It can be shown that the dummy remains statistically significant for some of the
lower quantiles, indicating evidence of contagion when the stock markets are down. This observation
is similar to Baur and Schulze (2005), who observe some evidence of contagion during the Asia
Financial Crisis of 1997, pointing to Hong Kong and Thailand as the crisis-originating countries.
Our findings show differences in the UK and the US on the contagion effects during the crisis. We
observe that the UK market at least has a contagion effect on one of the lower quantiles (i.e., 2nd,
4th, 6th, 8th and 10th quantiles) of the distributions throughout the period for most of the countries,
except for the Mexico and the US markets. In the case of the US market, it appears to have weaker
contagion effects. There is no evidence of contagion effect at all for UK, Japan, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Korea, Singapore and Thailand.
5.2 The Market Sentiments during the Credit Crisis Periods
In this section, we investigate the impact of the VIX index on the coexceedance. An increase
(decline) in the volatility index is assumed to signal a rise in investors’ aversion towards (tolerance
of) global risk. A positive relationship between VIX and the negative coexceedances and a negative
relationship with the positive coexceedances are therefore expected. Our findings show that, the
coexceedances involving the US market depend on market sentiments at the upper quantiles, as
it reveals a negative relationship with the VIX indices. In the case of the UK market, it appears
that market sentiments do not appear to have much impact on both upper and lower quantiles.
This is possible following the effect of the UK governmental intervention efforts as proxied by the
crisis dummies as discussed in Section 5.1. This makes it clear that the UK market is driven by the
7Table 1 lists out the news events and the sources of countries it originated.
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specific risk perceptions originating from the news events which are often unscheduled rather than a
general market sentiment.
5.3 The Impact of Conditional Volatility during the Credit Crisis Periods
Following Baur and Schulze (2005), we include conditional volatility as a control variable in our
model. This variable captures the global spillover effect of the UK or the US with their respective
paired stock markets. Our findings reveal that the global spillover of the UK or the US has an effect
on their respective coexceedances with other countries. However, we find that higher risk in either
the UK or the US market has a positive impact on the coexceedance only when the coexceedance is
located at the upper quantiles, i.e., when the joint returns on the UK or the US markets with their
respective countries pairs are high (i.e., positive). This suggests that, during good times the markets
react strongly to good news. Shocks to the aggregate stock markets during the ‘up’ cycles transmit
rapidly across markets resulting in comovements between the two markets.
The effect is observed to be stronger for the coexceedances involving the UK stock market.
According to our discussions in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, the UK appears to be affected by news events
of the interventions by the UK government as well as firms’ failures, which are often unscheduled
and unexpected, and with specific underlying risks that may not be factored into the existing market
sentiment. This results in higher sensitivity of the UK market to good news, which explains the
stronger relationships of the spillover effect between the UK and the rest of the world when the
coexceedances of the UK with other countries are higher.
To conclude our discussions, we report the R2 values, calculated according to Koenker and
Machado (1999) in Table 10. It can be seen that our model fits the data better at the extreme
quantiles. The values of R2 are somewhat higher when the parameters are evaluated at the tails of
the coexceedance distributions. Specifically, the R2 values at the 2nd and 98th quantiles are larger
than the values reported at the other quantiles.
We also perform tests of equality of parameters, proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1982), to test
the null hypotheses that the difference between the values of the parameters at the 10th quantile and
the 90th quantile is not statistically significant. We report our results in Table 11. The results for the
UK suggest the following: except for Germany, Mexico, Thailand and the US, the difference between
the parameters of the dummy variables at the 10th and 90th quantile is statistically significant at
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the conventional significance levels. As for the coefficients on the conditional volatility, we reject
the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level for all of the countries in our sample. This is also
true for the US, except that we cannot reject the null hypotheses for the UK, Indonesia and Taiwan.
The results for the US also show the coefficients on the dummy variable and the VIX do not seem to
differ at the extreme quantiles.
As indicated earlier in the paper, we employ the conditional volatility as a control variable
following recommendations by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) that underlying volatility of dataset to
have effects on correlation. Some significant impacts of this variable on the US coexceedances have
been earlier discussed. The significantly different effects of conditional volatility at the extreme
quantiles, further confirms this for the US market when regarding the coexceedance as an alternative
to correlations. However, this is slightly different in the case of the UK. For the UK, the conditional
volatility variables are significant at the upper quantile and significantly different effects were observed
at extreme quantiles. Even so, the dummy variables are significant for most countries, indicating that
news events have a notable impact on the co-movements of stock returns at the extreme quantiles.
6 Conclusions
The Global Financial Crisis began in 2007 when the subprime mortgage crisis, originated in the
US, spread rapidly to most financial markets around the globe, causing large volatility in the stock
markets. The crisis has motivated research such as that of Cheung et al. (2010) to study how shocks
originated from the dominant US market promptly and pervasively spilled over into other markets,
resulting in intensified interdependence among the global stock markets. Such research is important
as — unlike all previous crises such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian financial
crisis, and the 1999 Brazilian crisis — the latest crisis originated from the largest and most influential
economy, the US.
Research similar to Cheung et al. (2010) often focuses on anlaysing the impact of crisis on the
volatility and patterns of the stock markets during the period of the credit crisis. This includes
Dontis-Charitos et al. (2013) who investigate the return and volatility spillovers among the US
and other international markets during the period between 2007 to 2009. Their findings reveal the
presence of intensified return and volatility spillovers from the US to a number of markets. During
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this period, various news events took place whose effects on the stock markets cannot be ignored. It
has been shown by Tetlock (2007) that negative reports by the media underlying the news events
during the crisis do predict downward pressure on market prices. In this paper, we use the quantile
regression model along with the coexceedance as a contagion measure to assess the extent to which
such news events contribute to contagion in the stock markets during the crisis period. A study
by Rachdi (2013) has shown that, not only the subprime crisis leads to a global recession, but the
effects on the global stock markets have been significant. Our findings provide additional insights
into these effects.
Our research also reveals some interesting findings. We find that in the case of the US, no
significant contagion effects were observed. Though most of the news events from the US were of
similar nature to that of the UK, such as bank failure or the bailing out of failing banks. There were
news, however, that were welcomed by the markets, such as those relating to the Fed’s monetary
easing, providing a lifeline to the financial markets. Such news event is considered to be “promising
policy steps to resolve the crisis” as suggested in Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), which the empirical
evidence from our research lends support to. Their paper examines the impact of macroeconomics
and financial sector policy announcements in the US, UK, the euro area, and Japan on interbank
credit and liquidity risk premia. Their findings reveal that, overall, news events related to the policy
interventions are associated with a reduction in the interbank risk premia, most significantly for
recapitalization programs. By contrast, news events about the bail out of individual banks in an ad
hoc manner or let them fail are accompanied by a significant rise in the interbank risk premia.
In the case of the UK, our analysis shows that news events are associated with the contagion
effect in the stock markets. The rescue of Lloyds TSB by the UK government after the bank merged
with HBOS is an example. As Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) comment, “... Ad hoc bailouts targeted at
individual systemic institutions were accompanied by a worsening of market fears, possibly because
they were perceived as a signal that problems in the financial sector were worse than originally
assumed by markets ...” Their findings are consistent with our results for the UK, as the rescue
required an additional £175 billions — the amount reported to be a record high.8
Our approach deviates from several existing literatures such as Klomp (2013) and Greatrex
8Information provided by the global timeline as found on the BBC website
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8242825.stm).
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and Rengifo (2010). Klomp (2013) uses data on credit default swaps (CDS) as a benchmark to
estimate the impact of similar news events during the period of the credit crisis while Greatrex
and Rengifo (2010) examines the effects of government intervention during the 2007–2009 Financial
Crisis on CDS prices using a cross-section of 348 firms from both the financial and non-financial
sectors. They further find that the reaction to government actions is stronger for financial firms
than for non-financial firms.
Even though we use data on stock market indices (MSCI) in our paper, further investigations into
the contagion effects specifically on the finance and banking sector of each country will no doubt likely
to reveal more precise impacts on these sectors. Nevertheless, we observe some significant contagion
of the news events, particularly those from the UK. This can be explained by the relationship of the
information content of news story and its underlying implications, which reinforces the argument
that spreads and contagion — an outcome of the risk perception of financial markets — are solely a
result of the behaviour of investors or other financial market participants as suggested by Dornbusch
et al. (2001).
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Appendices
A.I
This appendix discusses the derivation of the Mardia’s tests for multivariate normality. It is briefly
redeveloped from Sweeting (2010). Numerical tests based on measures of multivariate (bivariate)
skew and kurtosis, known as Mardia’s test can be derived to test multivariate normality of data
sets or data pairs. To test whether observations are from a multivariate normal distribution, tests
are normally carried out jointly. Useful statistics in this regard are the the Mahalanobis distance
and the Mahalanobis angle Mahalanobis (1936). Mahalanobis distance deals with outliers within
datasets by identifying observations that lie far away from the centre of the data cloud, giving less
weight to variables with large variances or to groups of highly correlated variables Joliffe (1986). We
discuss the computation of the Mahalanobis distance as follows:
Consider the column vector Xtwhich contains the observations at time t where t = 1, 2, ..., T for
a group of N variables, so X Õt = (X1,t, X2,t, ..., XN,t). Let the column vector X contain the sample
mean for each variable calculated over all t = 1, 2, ..., T so X
Õ
t =
1
X1, X2, ..., XN
2
. Then, let S
be an N ×N matrix of the sample covariances of the N variables based on the observations from
t = 1, 2, ..., T : S
WWWWWWWWU
SX1X1 SX1X2 · · · SX1XN
SX2X1 SX2X2 · · · SX2XN
...
...
. . .
...
SXN X1 SXN X2 · · · SXN XN
T
XXXXXXXXV
(9)
where SXn,Xm is the sample covariance between the observations for variables m and n calculated
over all i = 1, 2, . . . , T , and where SXn,Xn = S
2
Xn
,the variance of the observations for variable n. The
Mahalanobis distance at time t, Dtis then calculated as:
Dt =
Ò
(Xt −X)
Õ
S≠1(Xt −X) (10)
Squaring the Mahalanobis distance gives the statistic that is the sum of N normal variables, if
the variables are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. The statistic D2t therefore has a
χ2distribution with N degrees of freedom. It is possible to derive numerical tests based on measures
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of multivariate skew and kurtosis, known as Mardia’s tests Mardia (1970), and this involves firstly
to define the Mahalanobis angle between observations at times s and t, Ds,t :
Ds,t = (Xs − X)
Õ
S−1(Xt − X) (11)
Following that, a skew-type parameter, WN can be calculated:
WN =
1
T 2
Tÿ
s=1
Tÿ
t=1
D3s,t (12)
Multiplying this by T/6 gives Mardia’s skew test statistic, MST , that has a χ2distribution with
N(N + 1)(N + 2)/6 degrees of freedom, which will be the case under the null hypothesis where it
will be a standard normal
MST =
T
6
WN ∼ X
2
N(N+1)(N+2)/6 (13)
For Mardia’s test of multivariate kurtosis, the kurtosis-type parameter, KN , is, however, calculated
from the Mahalanobis distance:
KN =
1
T
Tÿ
i=1
D4t (14)
This can be transformed into Mardia’s Kurtosis test statistic, MKT , which tends to a standard
normal distribution as T tends to infinity:
MKT =
KN ∼ N(N + 2)
8N(N + 2)/T
v N(0, 1) (15)
The three sets of 15 stock returns’ pairs, of which each involved the UK, US and the world indexes
are tested for multivariate normality based on Mardia’s multivariate skewness and multivariate
kurtosis, MST and MKT as above derived and defined. Our results show the null hypothesis of
multivariate normality are rejected for all three sets of the 15 stock returns’ pairs at 1%, 5% and 10%
significant levels. This implies the potential size dependent biases exist underlying the correlations
of the stock returns’ pairs involving the UK and the US stock markets, which directly supports the
use of the Quantile Regression approach along side coexceedance measures (from Baur and Schulze,
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2005). Quantile Regression measures relationship between variables on different quantiles of the
distribution, which automatically accounts for the size effects. This is therefore a relatively more
appropriate measure of contagion compared to that of correlation. All multivariate normality tests
used in this paper are all performed in Matlab.
A.II
In the BEKK-GARCH model the parameters of the conditional variance and conditional covariance
equations are estimated simultaneously by maximising the following log-likelihood function:
ln L (θ) = −
1
2
Tÿ
t=1
1
ln (|Ht|) + ε
Õ
tH
≠1
t εt
2
(16)
where Ht is the conditional covariance matrix and εt is the GARCH error vector at time t.
A.III
The quantile regression was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). The model assumes
that
Pr (yi ≤ τ | xi) = Fuθ
!
τ − xÕiβτ | xi
"
(17)
where i = 1, ..., n, (yi, xi) is a sample from some population and xi is a K × 1 vector of regressors.
Readers may be more familiar with representation with the following functional form:
yi = x
Õ
iβτ + uτi (18)
and
qτ (yi | xi) = x
Õ
iβτ (19)
where qτ (yi | xi) is the conditional quantile of yi conditional on the regressor vector xi.
The model assumes further that qτ (uτi | xi) = 0. The estimator of βτ at the τ
th quantile, βˆτ , is
the solution to the following minimisation problem:
min
β
nÿ
i=1
ρτ (uτi) = min
β
Y]
[
ÿ
i:yiØx
Õ
i
β
τ | yi − x
Õ
iβ | +
ÿ
i:yiÆx
Õ
i
β
(1 − τ) | yi − x
Õ
iβ |
Z^
\ (20)
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where ρτ (z) is the check function given by ρτ (z) = z
1
τ − 1[z≤0]
2
.
In this paper, we use the modified version of the Barrodale and Roberts algorithm to solve
the linear minimisation problem in (20). Both Koenker and D’Orey (1987) and Koenker and
D’Orey (1997) recommend the algorithm for problems up to several thousand observations. All the
estimations in this paper are performed in R.
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Table 1:  Lists of News Events between 2007 and 2009 related to the credit crisis 
No.* Event 
dates 
Event headlines
  
Brief descriptions** 
1 8/2/2007 HSBC WARNS 
OF SUBPRIME 
LOSSES 
HSBC reveals huge losses at its US mortgage arm 
Household Finance due to subprime losses, in one 
of the first signs that the US housing market is 
turning sour, and that it could have a knock-on 
effect on the global financial sector. 
 
2 2/4/2007 NEW 
CENTURY 
GOES BUST 
New Century Financial, a leading subprime lender, 
files for  
bankruptcy. It is the first signal that something is 
seriously amiss at US mortgage lenders.  
 
3 9/8/2007 CREDIT 
MARKETS 
FREEZE 
Credit markets go into freefall after Paribas 
announces that two of its hedge funds are frozen 
due to "complete evaporation of liquidity" in asset 
backed security market.  
 
4 14/9/2007 RUN ON THE 
ROCK 
Savers in beleaguered UK former building society 
Northern Rock begin withdrawing their savings 
after the BBC reveals the bank has received 
emergency financial support from the Bank of 
England.  
 
5 17/3/2008 BEAR 
STEARNS 
RESCUE 
US investment bank Bear Stearns is rescued by 
rival bank JP Morgan Chase after the US 
government provides a $30bn guarantee against its 
mounting losses. It is the first sign that, rather than 
easing, the financial crisis is getting worse but 
investors are relieved that US government prepared 
to act as lender of last resort. 
 
6 7/9/2008 FANNIE MAE 
RESCUE 
US government rescues giant mortgage lenders 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, taking them into 
temporary public ownership after they reveal huge 
losses on the US subprime mortgage market.  
 
7 15/9/2008 LEHMAN 
BROTHERS 
GOES 
BANKRUPT 
US investment bank Lehman Brothers goes 
bankrupt after the US government refuses to bail it 
out. Merrill Lynch is bought by Bank of America 
after revealing it also is facing huge losses. 
Insurance firm AIG, which issued credit guarantees 
for subprime mortgages, is rescued  
the next day with an $85bn loan from US Treasury. 
 
8 17/9/2008 LLOYDS 
TAKES OVER 
HBOS 
Lloyds agrees a £12.2bn takeover of the ailing 
Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), the UK's largest 
mortgage lender, after its shares plummet amid 
concerns over the firm's future. The UK 
Table
 
* We use event nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 as news originated from the US, and the 
remaining events originated from the UK.  
** More details about the News Stories are accessible from the chart on Global Recession 
Timeline by following the link, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8242825.stm   
 
government invokes a national interest clause to 
bypass competition law, as the new bank is 
responsible for close to one-third of the UK's 
savings and  
mortgage market. 
 
 
 
9 3/10/2008 $700BN 
BAILOUT 
APPROVED BY 
CONGRESS 
The biggest financial rescue in US history is 
approved after a gruelling debate in Congress, and 
initial defeat a week earlier. Republicans and 
Democrats alike were reluctant to bail out the banks 
with such large sums while ordinary citizens were 
suffering in the recession. Both presidential 
candidates endorse the bail-out. 
 
10 13/10/2008 UK 
GOVERNMENT 
RESCUES RBS 
AND LLOYDS-
HBOS 
 
 
 
Two of the UK's major banks, RBS and HBOS, are 
in major trouble as financial markets collapse. 
Having merged with HBOS in September, Lloyds is 
hit by the huge debts built up by its new partner in 
the mortgage market, while RBS is struggling with 
its expensive merger with ABN-AMRO. The UK 
government injects £37bn to stabilise both banks. 
11 16/12/2008 FED CUTS 
KEY RATE TO 
NEAR ZERO 
The US central bank cuts its interest rate to 0 - 
0.25% in an attempt to stem the deepening 
recession, and begins to consider a programme of 
quantitative easing to throw money into the 
economy to help make  
borrowing easier. It is the lowest interest in the 
history of the Fed. 
 
12 14/2/2009 US CONGRESS 
PASSES 
$787BN 
STIMULUS 
President Obama wins his first major victory in 
Congress as it passes a huge economic recovery 
plan aimed at preventing the US falling into 
recession as a result of the credit crunch.  
 
13 22/4/2009 UK BUDGET 
REVEALS 
HUGE DEFICIT 
The UK Chancellor Alistair Darling reveals that the 
credit crunch will lead to the largest budget deficit 
in UK financial history of £175bn, with total 
government debt set to double to £1 trillion by 
2014.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
  
Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
US 0.0144 0.2425 9.6558 -16.7475 2.6790 -1.1465 9.2982
UK -0.0393 0.2529 9.7916 -15.2200 3.3980 -0.7141 5.4434
Germany -0.0008 0.4373 12.8981 -17.5035 3.9888 -0.9613 6.2711
France -0.0732 0.2283 11.7826 -17.5809 3.8518 -0.6957 5.4163
Japan -0.0573 0.1502 13.6066 -15.0566 2.8889 -0.4355 6.2798
Argentina 0.1058 0.4734 27.2433 -23.0665 4.9655 -0.2445 7.1814
Brazil 0.2486 0.9572 13.1659 -44.5338 5.4799 -1.9059 15.0795
Chile 0.2240 0.4879 13.9037 -32.5032 3.7422 -1.9180 19.3116
Mexico 0.1795 0.4984 13.8131 -37.3137 4.3913 -2.0195 17.7523
Hong Kong 0.0792 0.1337 14.0331 -15.7986 3.3433 -0.1570 6.2682
Indonesia 0.3366 0.8284 23.2931 -31.8198 5.1684 -0.8710 9.8148
Korea 0.1273 0.6139 30.0234 -26.4848 5.1003 -0.4464 10.2982
Malaysia 0.1910 0.3892 13.1125 -10.1609 2.6639 -0.2014 5.0473
The Phillipines 0.1881 0.1081 14.2098 -16.3804 3.9250 -0.2588 4.5827
Singapore 0.1074 0.4527 18.3912 -17.0474 3.5505 -0.2347 7.3540
Taiwan 0.0010 0.3833 18.0963 -12.5569 3.7343 -0.0920 5.3344
Thailand 0.1559 0.5803 21.9321 -22.8786 4.4204 -0.4367 7.0393
Table 3: Unconditional pairwise correlations between all analysed markets 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of the correlation during the tranquil and crisis period for the US and the UK as origins 
 
  
US UK Ger Fra Jap Arg Bra Chi Mex HK Ind Kor Mal Phi Sin Tai Tha
US 1.00
UK 0.58 1.00
Germany 0.66 0.83 1.00
France 0.66 0.86 0.96 1.00
Japan 0.39 0.62 0.61 0.61 1.00
Argentina 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.60 0.41 1.00
Brazil 0.59 0.73 0.69 0.70 0.56 0.63 1.00
Chile 0.51 0.58 0.62 0.61 0.50 0.49 0.62 1.00
Mexico 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.53 0.55 0.76 0.61 1.00
Hong Kong 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.43 0.55 0.59 0.62 1.00
Indonesia 0.39 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.38 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.60 1.00
Korea 0.45 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.47 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.56 1.00
Malaysia 0.31 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.33 0.41 0.51 0.44 0.57 0.50 0.46 1.00
The Phillipines 0.43 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.58 0.31 0.52 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.50 1.00
Singapore 0.37 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.66 0.34 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.70 0.70 0.66 0.72 0.61 1.00
Taiwan 0.38 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.58 0.32 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.64 0.64 0.70 0.54 0.48 0.70 1.00
Thailand 0.31 0.64 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.44 0.59 0.48 0.53 0.42 0.53 0.62 0.55 0.50 0.62 0.56 1.00
US UK Ger Fra Jap Arg Bra Chi Mex HK Ind Kor Mal Phi Sin Tai Tha
US 1.00 0.58 0.66 0.66 0.39 0.59 0.59 0.51 0.69 0.54 0.39 0.45 0.31 0.43 0.37 0.38 0.31
US (Crisis) 1.00 0.81 0.76 0.80 0.59 0.57 0.79 0.62 0.81 0.64 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.68 0.52 0.50
UK 0.58 1.00 0.83 0.86 0.62 0.58 0.73 0.58 0.72 0.59 0.57 0.63 0.51 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.64
UK (Crisis) 0.81 1.00 0.89 0.93 0.67 0.69 0.80 0.64 0.74 0.70 0.57 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.77 0.67 0.59
  
 
Table 5: Percentages of coexceedances 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Skewness of coexceedances 
 
US UK Ger Fra Jap Arg Bra Chi Mex HK Ind Kor Mal Phi Sin Tai Tha
US (Negative) n/a 34.37 31.55 32.96 28.45 30.70 31.83 29.58 33.52 30.42 24.23 29.58 28.17 30.99 27.89 26.76 27.61
US (Positive) n/a 45.35 45.35 45.63 36.34 41.41 46.76 42.25 45.35 39.44 40.85 40.85 41.69 39.15 42.82 37.75 40.85
UK (Negative) 34.37 n/a 36.34 38.87 33.24 31.55 33.52 31.83 31.55 34.08 27.04 31.83 31.83 32.39 32.96 29.86 30.42
UK (Positive) 45.35 n/a 48.45 49.86 39.44 40.56 46.76 42.82 41.69 41.41 41.97 41.41 43.66 38.87 46.20 39.15 41.97
US UK Ger Fra Jap Arg Bra Chi Mex HK Ind Kor Mal Phi Sin Tai Tha
US n/a -1.58 -1.80 -1.71 -2.35 -2.05 -1.53 -1.98 -1.42 -1.98 -2.63 -2.10 -0.91 -1.55 -2.03 -1.62 -2.25
US (excl. 0) n/a -1.40 -1.59 -1.51 -1.86 -1.72 -1.38 -1.73 -1.27 -1.66 -2.15 -1.76 -0.80 -1.29 -1.70 -1.27 -1.86
UK -1.58 n/a -1.00 -0.91 -1.38 -1.00 -0.96 -0.81 -1.09 -0.96 -1.03 -1.17 -0.37 -0.66 -1.01 -1.07 -0.80
UK (excl. 0) -1.40 n/a -0.92 -0.85 -1.14 -0.82 -0.86 -0.75 -0.95 -0.81 -0.87 -0.98 -0.36 -0.55 -0.89 -0.85 -0.68
  
 
 
 
Table 7: Quantile regression estimates for the dummy variable 
 
The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at 10% and 5% respectively. 
 
  
Quantile 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.50 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98
US as Origin
UK -1.435 -1.476 -0.889 -0.969 -1.246 -0.507 -0.673* -0.861* -1.006* -1.229* -1.507*
Germany 0.033 0.238 -0.949 -0.807 -1.204* -0.891** -0.774* -0.896* -1.030 -1.773** -1.315
France -1.435 -0.123 -0.835 -0.956 -1.333* -0.581* -0.739 -1.011* -0.983 -1.796** -1.341
Japan -0.707 -1.028 -0.732 -0.647 -0.536 -0.725** -0.671* -0.592 -0.739* -0.902* -1.093
Argentina -0.849 -0.207 -1.023 -1.058 -1.258 -1.123** -0.784* -0.669 -1.340* -1.376 -1.292
Brazil -1.435 -0.270 -1.258 -1.093 -1.385 -0.401 -0.775 -0.711 -1.131 -0.665 -0.550
Chile -0.818 -0.846 -1.647 -1.619 -1.518 -0.899** -0.730 -0.853 -1.061 -1.215 -1.273
Mexico -1.446 -0.438 -1.213 -1.600** -1.444* -0.837** -0.496 -0.866 -1.283* -1.402* -0.858
Hong Kong -1.161 -2.600** -1.976** -1.704** -1.400* -0.973** -0.261 -0.243 -0.375 -0.613 -0.168
Indonesia -1.648 -2.194* -2.240* -1.913 -2.118* -0.746* -0.385 -0.443 -0.163 -0.277 -0.581
Korea 0.721 -0.800 -1.097 -0.909 -1.326 -1.153** -0.948** -0.804 -0.890 -1.100 0.133
Malaysia -1.570* -1.465 -1.962** -1.845** -1.809** -0.764** -0.440 -0.325 -0.161 -0.241 -0.263
The Phillipines -2.106* -2.078* -1.394 -1.619* -1.765** -0.629** -0.483 -0.484 -0.627 -1.462* -1.665**
Singapore -0.476 -1.599 -0.769 -0.839 -1.413 -0.829** -0.541 -0.702 -0.962 -1.221* -2.042**
Taiwan -1.052 -2.448* -2.764** -2.284** -2.180** -0.583 -0.258 -0.235 -0.240 -0.896 -0.869
Thailand -1.580 -1.459 -1.073 -0.674 -1.197 -0.918** -0.667 -0.758 -1.136** -1.386** -1.364**
UK as Origin
US -1.861 -2.246 -0.924 -0.810 -1.279 -0.824* -1.089** -0.459 -0.434 -0.586 -0.674
Germany -0.599 -1.161 -1.011 -1.741* -1.557 -0.676 -0.609 -0.129 0.599 0.057 -0.071
France -2.377 -3.060* -2.057 -1.872 -2.561** -0.439 -0.318 -0.285 0.680 0.535 0.511
Japan -2.695 -2.509 -2.263** -1.757* -1.667** -0.694 0.418 0.461 0.349 0.205 1.387
Argentina -0.496 -2.439 -2.184* -2.649** -3.301** -1.528* -1.166 -1.212 -0.163 0.489 0.703
Brazil -2.593 -2.866** -2.035** -1.935** -2.624** -0.404 -0.997 -0.640 1.037 0.827 0.488
Chile -2.417 -3.166 -2.380* -2.117** -2.478** -0.800 -0.535 -0.679 -0.359 0.923 0.726
Mexico -3.977 -2.602 -1.548 -1.945 -1.773 -1.235** -0.419 -0.446 -0.442 -0.550 -0.476
Hong Kong -2.357 -2.976* -2.807** -2.786** -2.774** -0.768 0.228 0.039 0.107 1.725 0.100
Indonesia -2.293 -2.666 -3.301** -3.701** -4.210** -0.612 1.017 0.768 0.089 0.898 0.279
Korea -1.589 -1.760 -1.884** -2.514** -2.610** -1.921** -0.130 -0.403 -0.547 0.507 0.336
Malaysia -2.016** -3.058** -3.217** -3.363** -2.530** -0.721 0.540 0.648 0.524 1.340 -0.417
The Phillipines -2.746 -3.990** -3.712** -3.999** -4.205** -1.235** 0.188 0.666 0.905 1.016 0.876
Singapore -1.906 -2.184 -2.688** -2.963** -2.465** -0.629 -0.003 -0.125 -0.604 -0.639 -0.301
Taiwan -1.421 -2.309 -3.237** -3.663** -3.689** -1.441** 0.336 1.287 2.145* 1.686 1.662
Thailand -2.667 -2.590 -3.156** -3.278** -2.258** -0.617 -1.213 -0.237 -0.123 0.885 0.276
  
 
 
Table 8: Quantile regression estimates for VIX 
 
The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at 10% and 5% respectively. 
  
Quantile 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.50 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98
US as Origin
UK 0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.012** -0.016** -0.018** -0.025** -0.026* -0.029
Germany 0.003 -0.008 -0.013 0.001 0.002 -0.012** -0.023** -0.023** -0.028** -0.029* -0.046*
France 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 0.004 0.005 -0.009 -0.024** -0.028** -0.029** -0.029* -0.046*
Japan -0.006 -0.016 -0.014 0.002 0.000 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.012 -0.024*
Argentina 0.004 -0.006 0.000 -0.008 -0.005 -0.016** -0.019** -0.020** -0.027** -0.036** -0.046*
Brazil 0.003 0.000 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.007 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022
Chile 0.007 -0.008 0.008 0.007 -0.003 -0.011 -0.016* -0.016 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029
Mexico 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 0.002 0.004 -0.011* -0.002 -0.009 -0.026* -0.025 0.012
Hong Kong 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.001 -0.014** -0.018** -0.018** -0.022** -0.028* -0.013
Indonesia -0.008 -0.016 -0.010 -0.022 -0.010 -0.018** -0.020** -0.017** -0.021** -0.031** -0.036**
Korea -0.005 -0.008 -0.011 -0.012 -0.002 -0.016** -0.019** -0.020** -0.027** -0.025 -0.007
Malaysia 0.019 0.011 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.011** -0.019** -0.022** -0.017* -0.013 -0.025
The Phillipines -0.010 -0.025 -0.013 -0.003 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012* -0.008 -0.017* -0.036** -0.045**
Singapore -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 -0.012** -0.020** -0.026** -0.029** -0.036** -0.036
Taiwan 0.007 -0.012 -0.005 -0.013 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 -0.010 -0.022 -0.003
Thailand -0.006 -0.022 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.017** -0.011 -0.017** -0.020* -0.029* -0.030
UK as Origin
US -0.106 -0.016 -0.011 0.004 0.000 -0.008 -0.012** -0.012** -0.010 -0.016 0.008
Germany -0.023 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.012 -0.009 0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.013 0.000
France -0.019 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.013 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011
Japan -0.003 -0.014 -0.015* -0.014 -0.008 -0.004 0.012** 0.010* 0.011* 0.006 0.011
Argentina 0.011 -0.021 0.001 -0.009 -0.012 -0.014* 0.006 0.008 0.005 -0.015 -0.003
Brazil -0.022 -0.027 0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.001 -0.001
Chile -0.015 -0.033 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.005
Mexico -0.022 -0.023 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 0.008 0.017 0.013 0.005 0.006
Hong Kong -0.010 -0.006 -0.011 -0.007 -0.012 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.021
Indonesia -0.018 -0.024 -0.009 -0.014 -0.015 -0.010 -0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010
Korea -0.007 -0.021 -0.019 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012* 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.003 -0.011
Malaysia 0.002 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 0.010 0.004 0.009
The Phillipines -0.002 -0.011 -0.017 -0.019* -0.021** -0.006 0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.014 -0.008
Singapore -0.035 0.001 -0.016 -0.011 -0.013 -0.008 -0.006 0.002 0.005 -0.005 0.001
Taiwan -0.012 -0.005 -0.020 -0.022 -0.013 -0.011 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 0.016
Thailand -0.014 0.001 -0.007 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.001 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.025
  
 
 
Table 9: Quantile regression estimates for the conditional volatility 
 
The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at 10% and 5% respectively. 
 
 
 
Quantile 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.50 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98
US as Origin
UK -1.883 -1.228 -1.607** -1.599** -1.117** -0.036 0.819** 0.817** 0.819** 1.120** 1.359**
Germany -1.883 -1.584 -1.543** -1.248** -1.131** -0.010 0.774** 0.759** 0.745** 0.816** 0.673
France -1.883 -1.479 -1.563** -1.164* -0.971* 0.005 0.678** 0.661** 0.816** 0.874** 0.774
Japan -0.954 -1.013 -0.729 -0.955** -1.005** -0.132 0.669** 0.746** 0.815** 0.779** 0.659
Argentina -3.619** -1.517 -1.284* -1.214** -1.131** -0.312* 0.695** 0.538** 0.678** 0.563 0.587
Brazil -1.883 -1.436 -1.446* -1.118* -1.146** 0.167 1.144** 1.401** 1.379** 1.490** 1.282**
Chile -3.003** -0.640 -0.719 -0.730 -0.674 0.076 0.774** 0.783** 0.676* 1.341** 1.263**
Mexico -2.271* -1.443 -1.456** -1.012* -0.887* -0.099 1.023** 1.066** 1.053** 1.469** 1.998**
Hong Kong -1.675 -0.528 -0.749 -0.796* -0.842** 0.036 0.508** 0.493** 0.493* 0.410 1.300*
Indonesia -3.393** -0.930 -1.082 -1.217* -0.546 -0.001 0.526** 0.481** 0.419 0.281 0.241
Korea -2.856** -1.368 -1.503** -1.351** -1.059* -0.053 0.768** 0.700** 0.636** 0.927* 1.487**
Malaysia -0.800* -0.736** -0.740* -0.407 -0.443 -0.105 0.318** 0.289* 0.461** 0.453* 0.427
The Phillipines -2.248** -0.882 -0.373 -0.467 -0.265 -0.016 0.480** 0.583** 0.577** 0.626* 0.580
Singapore -3.045* -0.954 -0.707 -0.750 -0.608 0.027 0.691** 0.661** 0.638** 0.576 0.576
Taiwan -2.425** -0.570 -0.671 -0.817 -0.630 -0.030 0.555** 0.466** 0.643** 0.714 1.555**
Thailand -3.176** -0.980 -1.055 -0.872* -0.590 0.067 0.727** 0.708** 0.720** 0.640** 0.748
UK as Origin
US -0.212 -0.974* -1.334** -1.233** -0.673 0.261 1.112** 1.101** 1.147** 1.060** 1.939**
Germany -2.319* -1.845** -1.961** -1.335* -1.309* 0.352 1.434** 1.528** 1.621** 1.872** 1.931**
France -1.613 -1.471** -1.703** -1.234* -1.038 0.274 1.765** 1.685** 1.567** 1.525** 1.623**
Japan -0.115 -0.415 -0.544* -0.629** -0.559* 0.014 0.779** 0.797** 0.971** 0.947** 0.754
Argentina -0.675 -0.470 -0.772* -0.792** -0.761** -0.013 1.640** 1.655** 1.555** 0.929** 1.133**
Brazil -1.590 -1.338** -1.757** -1.064 -0.883 0.566** 1.763** 1.841** 1.647** 1.436** 1.469**
Chile -0.017 0.034 -0.367 -0.523 -0.548 0.416* 1.323** 1.495** 1.434** 1.194** 1.310*
Mexico -1.086 -0.910 -1.344** -1.392** -1.308* 0.539* 1.297** 1.518** 1.449** 1.373** 1.888**
Hong Kong -0.356 -0.487 -0.774** -0.443 -0.497* 0.097 0.813** 0.880** 0.756* 0.682 1.001
Indonesia -0.511 -0.471 -0.695* -0.465 -0.457 0.243 0.765* 0.960** 1.411** 1.286** 1.547**
Korea -1.229 -1.263** -1.301** -1.200** -0.946** 0.237 1.018** 1.211** 1.163** 0.956** 1.041**
Malaysia -0.216 -0.102 -0.340 -0.111 -0.322 0.125 0.786** 0.747** 0.770* 0.592 1.260**
The Phillipines -0.350 -0.232 -0.358 -0.377 -0.374 0.080 0.948** 0.827 1.129** 0.947* 1.273*
Singapore -0.374 -0.764 -0.715* -0.450 -0.282 0.173 0.981** 1.011** 1.155** 1.314** 1.156**
Taiwan -0.392 -0.441 -0.398 -0.400 -0.481** 0.265 0.779** 0.582 0.616 0.723 1.396**
Thailand -0.311 -0.034 -0.062 -0.040 -0.107 0.275 1.273** 1.360** 1.044** 1.023** 0.933*
  
 
Table 10: The goodness-of-fit (R-squared) measures of the quantile regression models 
 
  
Quantile 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.50 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98
US as Origin
UK 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.22
Germany 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.18
France 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.18
Japan 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10
Argentina 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.15
Brazil 0.19 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.27
Chile 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15
Mexico 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.21
Hong Kong 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
Indonesia 0.29 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10
Korea 0.23 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13
Malaysia 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.01
The Phillipines 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.14
Singapore 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12
Taiwan 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.15
Thailand 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09
UK as Origin
US 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.27
Germany 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.24
France 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.22
Japan 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.22
Argentina 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.19
Brazil 0.22 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22
Chile 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.14
Mexico 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.17
Hong Kong 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.16
Indonesia 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.19
Korea 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.21
Malaysia 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.16
The Phillipines 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.22
Singapore 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.17
Taiwan 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.18
Thailand 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.15
  
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Tests of equality of slope parameters 
 
The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at 10% and 5% respectively. 
 
Dummy VIX Volatility Dummy VIX Volatility
US -0.190 0.011 -1.785**
UK -0.573 0.019 -1.936
Germany -0.948 -0.015 -2.743** -0.431 0.025** -1.905**
France -2.244* -0.018 -2.804** -0.594 0.030** -1.650*
Japan -2.086** -0.021** -1.338** 0.135 0.007 -1.674**
Argentina -2.135** -0.018 -2.401** -0.474 0.014 -1.826**
Brazil -1.627* -0.015 -2.646** -0.609 0.005 -2.290**
Chile -1.943** -0.004 -1.871** -0.787 0.013 -1.448**
Mexico -1.354 -0.016 -2.605** -0.949 0.006 -1.910**
Hong Kong -3.029** -0.005 -1.310** -1.139 0.019* -1.350**
Indonesia -5.227** -0.010 -1.223** -1.827 0.010 -1.072
Korea -2.479** -0.026* -1.964** -0.378 0.016 -1.827**
Malaysia -3.070** -0.009 -1.108** -1.369** 0.018* -0.761**
The Phillipines -4.393** -0.023** -1.322** -1.282* 0.004 -0.745**
Singapore -2.460** -0.007 -1.263** -0.872 0.015 -1.299**
Taiwan -4.025** -0.013 -1.259** -2.486* 0.005 -1.185
Thailand -1.045 -0.008 -1.380** -0.529 0.012 -1.317**
UK US
